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Abstract
This paper shows that monopoly in the capital equipment market results
in higher productivity and wages but lower employment relative to the bench-
mark of competition. The combined eﬀect on workers’ welfare is negative for
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and the wage earned when employed, is lowered. More interestingly, the de-
clines in employment and expected earnings are greater for low skill workers.
Increases in the relative supply of high skill workers intensify the declines. The
employment and expected earnings of all workers as well as the employment of
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supply of high skill workers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
How product market competition aﬀects productivity, wages and employment is an
important question. It bears on how much of the deteriorating employment prospect
of low skill workers in many developed countries in recent years can be attributed
to the increased competition from low wage countries. In turn, opposition against
market liberalization has often arisen out of the perceived threat to the employment
of workers in the protected sectors. This view is not without merit. In the monopoly
rent sharing models surveyed in Nickell (1999), workers do earn higher wages in firms
that possess greater market power. And so any market liberalizations that erode the
market power of the firms can certainly lower wages.
There are other dimensions to the eﬀects of product market competition on labour
market outcomes. This paper contributes to the debate by exploring a channel in
which product market competition instead benefits workers in general and low skill
workers in particular. The analysis borrows heavily from the celebrated Mussa and
Rosen (1978) monopoly pricing model. In the Mussa and Rosen model, buyers are
diﬀerentiated by their intensities of preference for the quality of the good. All buyer
types are made worse oﬀ in monopoly in comparison to competition. But it is the
low demand buyers that are particularly shortchanged by market power. Increased
competition should thus benefit low demand buyers more than high demand buyers.
The model can be easily adapted to study to the eﬀects of market power on the
labour market by taking the buyers as firms with job vacancies to fill and the good
as capital equipment. Assuming physical and human capital complementarity, firms
employing high skill workers are high demand buyers that are willing to pay more for
more productive capital equipment. The insights from the Mussa and Rosen model
immediately suggest that market power will make workers of all skill levels worse oﬀ
and more so for low skill workers.
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The analysis of employment in this paper is based on the job—matching model
introduced by Pissarides (1990) and Diamond and Blanchard (1989) in which the
matching of workers and job vacancies is governed by a constant returns to scale
and concave job matching function. To the standard model, I add the analysis of
monopoly pricing in the market for capital equipment and compare the productiv-
ity, employment and wages of high and low skill workers to a benchmark of perfect
competition in the capital equipment market.
Not unexpectedly, monopoly pricing in the input market, by virtue of extracting
greater surplus from firms in the downstream industry, lowers the employment of
workers of all skill levels. The eﬀects on productivity and wages are less obvious. As
fewer jobs are created, the labour markets become less tight and so the vacancies are
filled with higher probabilities. As a result, firms will find it optimal to invest in more
productive equipment for the equipment will be employed more often. Higher wages
then follow from the increased productivity of the job matches . Even though the jobs
oﬀered are better jobs, workers are made worse oﬀ in comparison to the competitive
benchmark. That is the case as the expected earnings, defined as the product of the
probability of employment and the wage earned when employed, are lowered.
Are firms hiring high skill workers necessarily willing to pay more for more produc-
tive equipment given the assumed physical—human capital complementarity and so a
perfectly discriminating monopolist will find it optimal to oﬀer them more productive
equipment at a higher price? The answer is no. In a job—matching model, there is no
unambiguous ranking among firms hiring workers of diﬀerent skill levels in terms of
the willingness to pay for more productive equipment. The assumed physical—human
capital complementarity certainly tends to cause firms hiring high skill workers will-
ing to pay more. But the willingness to pay also depends on the probability that the
job vacancies are filled which in turn depends on the monopolist’s pricing policy. In
some special case, a perfectly discriminating monopolist will find it optimal not to
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discriminate among firms hiring workers of diﬀerent skill levels, but to oﬀer the same
piece of equipment for sale to all firms at identical prices. In general, a perfectly
discriminating monopolist does find it optimal to adopt a pricing policy that would
make firms in the high skill market willing to pay more for more productive equipment
and discriminate firms in the two markets by selling more productive equipment to
the high skill market at a higher price.
Perfect price discrimination is seldom feasible in practice. Absent the ability to
diﬀerentiate firms oﬀering jobs to workers of diﬀerent skill levels, the monopolist will
have to rely on firms self-selecting themselves into the appropriate markets. To do so,
the price-productivity pairs oﬀered in the diﬀerent markets have to obey some incen-
tive compatibility constraints that ensure that firms hiring workers of one skill type
indeed find it optimal to invest in the equipment targeted at the market concerned.
It turns out that a monopolist restricted to second degree price discrimination will
choose not to discriminate altogether, but to sell the same piece of equipment to all
firms at identical prices, just as in those special cases of perfect price discrimination.
The quality of the equipment to be oﬀered for sale in this case is a compromise of
the two distinct qualities in perfect price discrimination. Specifically, firms hiring low
skill workers will be forced to invest in more productive and more costly equipment
than otherwise whereas firms in the high skill market may now enjoy the benefit of
investing in less costly equipment. The expected return on job creation in the low
skill market is forced down further below while the expected return in the high skill
market rises above the respective expected returns in perfect price discrimination.
Hence low skill workers are made worse oﬀ relatively more than high skill workers in
second degree price discrimination.
In response to an increase in the relative supply of high skill workers, the monopolist
will find it optimal to raise the quality and price of the single piece of equipment
oﬀered for sale. This lowers the expected returns on job creation in both markets.
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In equilibrium, job creation for both skill types go down.1 Furthermore, the decline
is greater in the low skill market. Hence as more of the population acquires skills,
low skill unemployment will go up both absolutely and relatively. Similar results are
established in Saint—Paul (1996) and Acemoglu (1997). These studies model the idea
that the hiring of a low skill worker involves the forgone opportunity of recruiting a
high skill worker for the job vacancy. When the supply of high skill workers become
more abundant, firms are increasingly unwilling to fill job vacancies with low skill
workers. In these models, the fortunes of high and low skill workers resemble a zero—
sum game, with more jobs for one skill type at the expense of less jobs for the other.
In contrast, an increase in the relative supply of high skill workers in the present
model will cause the employment of both skill types to go down. Nevertheless, as the
decline is greater for low skill workers, the prediction is similar to those of Saint—Paul
(1996) and Acemoglu (1997).
The next section presents the model. In section 3, I solve the model with a com-
petitive market for capital equipment to set up a benchmark for comparison. The
eﬀects of monopoly are examined in section 4. Section 5 discusses the eﬃciencies of
the various market structures considered in the paper. Section 6 provides some brief
concluding remarks.
2. MODEL
A. Environment
The output market is perfectly competitive and the demand is perfectly elastic
at a unit price of one.2 The production is fixed coeﬃcient, with each employed
1The aggregate employment rate could well go up since there are more workers in the high
employment group.
2There is no change in substance under the alternative assumption that there is a downward
sloping demand curve. For the welfare eﬀects of monopoly pricing in an upstream industry selling
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worker equipped with one machine and where machine qualities and worker skills
are complements. Specifically, the output produced by a worker with skill level h
matched to a machine of quality q, which costs c (q) = qγ for some γ > 1 to produce,3
is given by
y = hq. (1)
There are two periods t = 0 and 1. In t = 0, a firm may create a job vacancy by
investing a fixed sum equal to c. In t = 1, job matches are formed among firms that
have previously posted vacancies and workers searching for jobs. There are two skill
levels: high skill hH and low skill hL, where hH > hL and two spatially separated
labour markets, one for each skill type. I rule out cross-market searches by assuming
that firms posting vacancies in the market for high skill workers can make a credible
threat not to hire any low skill workers that happen to show up.4
The matching of vacancies and workers is governed by the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides job matching function m (vs, ns) which yields the number of successful job
matches in the market for s = H or L workers as a function of the number of vacancies
vs posted and the number of workers searching for jobs in the market, which I assume
to be fixed at some ns. Under the usual assumption that the job matching function
exhibits constant returns to scale, the probability that a type s worker is successfully
matched with a job is µ (θs) = m (θs, 1) where θs = vs/ns is the tightness of the labour
to a competitive downstream industry facing a downward sloping demand curve, see Ordover and
Panzar (1982).
3It may appear odd that machine production exhibits constant returns in quantity but decreasing
returns in quality. With the state of knowledge fixed at a given point in time, it is probably not
unreasonable that it would be progressively more costly to produce more productive equipment. If
the industry is small relative to the entire economy, the constant returns in quantity assumption is
not inappropriate.
4Similar assumptions are made in Saint-Paul (1996) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) where
they rule out cross-market searches by assuming that low skill workers are completely unproductive
in jobs designed for high skill workers.
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market for type s workers. The probability that a vacancy posted for type s workers
is filled is η (θs) = m (1, θ−1s ) = µ (θs) /θs. Assuming that the matching function is
increasing in both arguments, the workers’ employment probability µ is increasing
while the firms’ recruiting probability η is decreasing in θ.
B. Timing of events
Investment in physical capital by firms is irreversible, and will have to be made
before job matches are formed.5 The assumption is arguably the more empirically
relevant assumption than the alternative that investment may be made after the
vacancies are filled. It turns out that the timing assumption is not crucial as the
more important results of the paper survive the change in the timing assumption
under some appropriate conditions.6 (To the referee: the analysis with the alternative
timing assumption is in appendix B at the end of the paper) Now with investment
sunk before job matches are formed, the appropriable surplus created by a job match
is simply the match’s gross output as specified in (1) which I assume to be shared
by the firm and the worker in fixed proportion via Nash bargaining, with β < 1 the
worker’s share and 1 − β the firm’s share. To summarize, the timing of events is as
follows:
(i) In t = 0, firms post vacancies by paying the fixed cost of job creation c and the
cost of physical capital investment p (q) that depends on the qualities of the machines
that they purchase,
(ii) In t = 1, the matching of vacancies and workers takes place as governed by
m (vs, ns),
(iii) production then commences and the parties share the appropriable surplus y = hq
5Investment can be reversible only if there is a second hand market for machines, which is not
consistent with the premise of this paper that machine producers may possess market power.
6The analysis under the alternative timing assumption is in an appendix available upon request.
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in fixed proportion.
The expected return on job creation for s = H or L workers is thus equal to
Rs (θs) = max
q
{η (θs) (1− β)hsq − p (q)− c} . (2)
There is free entry in job creation. Hence in the absence of non-price rationing in the
market for machines, job creation will proceed until Rs (θs) = 0.
3. COMPETITIVE BENCHMARK
To isolate the eﬀects of monopoly in capital equipment on employment and wages, I
shall first close the model assuming that the market for machines is competitive to set
up a benchmark for comparison. If the market for capital equipment is competitive,
the supply of machines of quality q will be perfectly elastic at the price p (q) = qγ
that is equal to the unit cost of production. Taking first order condition of (2) yields
qs =
Ã
η (θs) hs (1− β)
γ
! 1
γ−1
. (3)
For a given probability that a vacancy will be filled, firms will invest in higher quality
machines for higher skill workers due to the physical and human capital comple-
mentarity. And for a given skill level, firms will invest in higher quality machines if
vacancies are more likely to be filled. Although both the output market and the mar-
ket for machines are competitive, the investment choice is not generally eﬃcient. For
there is the usual under-investment in physical capital that results from the holdup
problem in bargaining models of wage determination. Eﬃciency in physical capital
investment is attained only if firms may appropriate the entire match surplus, i.e.
when β = 0.
Substituting (3) into (2), we have under free entry in job creationÃ
η (θs)hs (1− β)
γ
! γ
γ−1
(γ − 1) = c. (4)
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The left side is the firm’s expected net revenue. So long as it exceeds the fixed cost of
job creation, more vacancies will be posted, raising θs and driving down η (θs) in the
process.7 The condition implies that η (θs) is decreasing in hs, meaning that more
vacancies will be created in equilibrium for higher skill workers. This should be the
case since if the higher skill workers help firms earn a greater profit, the zero expected
return condition is only met when each vacancy is filled with a lower probability via
greater job creation.
With skill—machine quality complementarity, does it necessarily follow that firms
will invest in higher quality equipment for higher skill workers? Interestingly, the
answer is no. In particular, (4) implies that η (θs)hs is independent of hs and from
(3), qs is therefore independent of hs. In other words, high and low skill workers
will be equipped with machines of the same quality in equilibrium. The assumed
skill-quality complementarity certainly tends to cause machine qualities to increase
with skills. There is, however, an indirect and negative eﬀect that works through the
probability that vacancies are filled. If the vacancies created for higher skill workers
will only be filled with a lower probability because of the more intense competition for
workers, by (3) firms find it optimal to invest in lower quality machines. In general, the
overall eﬀect can be either positive or negative. Under the multiplicative specification
adopted for the production function in (1) , the two eﬀects however exactly cancel
7To ensure that a positive number of jobs are created, the left side of (4) has to exceed c so that
the equation may only be solved by some η (θs) < 1. Otherwise, the firm can not recover the fixed
cost of job creation even when the vacancy will be filled with certainty in which case no jobs will be
created in equilibrium.
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out, leaving neither a positive nor negative eﬀect of skill levels on machine qualities.8 I
focus on this case as the multiplicative specification oﬀers considerable simplification
of the analysis and eases the comparison with the monopoly pricing literature in
which the multiplicative specification is standard.
With hH > hL, a direct corollary of (4) is that θH > θL in equilibrium. The practical
importance is that high skill workers should enjoy a higher rate of employment. There
is a long line of inquiry including the early work of Akerlof (1969) and more recent
investigations like Machin and Manning (1997) that has adopted similar arguments as
explanations for why low skill workers suﬀer higher unemployment. This conclusion,
however, is subject to the qualification that it is not too expensive to create jobs for
high skill workers relative to low skill workers. If the fixed costs of job creation for
the two types of workers cH and cL are not identical as assumed above but instead
cH > cL. Then θH may not exceed θL even if hH > hL. We have from (4) again
η (θH)
η (θL)
=
µ
cH
cL
¶γ−1
γ hL
hH
from which it follows that η (θH) /η (θL) < 1 only if (cH/cL)
γ−1
γ < hH/hL. That is the
productivity diﬀerential has to exceed the cost diﬀerential suﬃciently for the theory
to predict higher unemployment for low skill workers. Although not an implausi-
ble assumption, this restriction does render the prediction less robust. To foretell
what follows, higher unemployment for low skill workers does become a more robust
prediction of theory under monopoly in capital equipment.
8In general, for any production function f (h, q) , it can be shown that
sign
µ
dq
dh
¶
= sign
µ
f (h, q)
∂2f (h, q)
∂h∂q −
∂f (h, q)
∂h
∂f (h, q)
∂q
¶
which may be either positive or negative. For example suppose output is CES in skill and machine
quality f (h, q) =
¡
hλ + qλ
¢ 1
λ . Then dq/dh >< 0 if and only if λ
<
> 0. This explains why with a
simple multiplicative specification f (h, q) = hq, workers of any skill levels will be equipped with
machines of the same quality as dq/dh = 0 in this case.
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The competitive benchmark is not eﬃcient.9 First there is the under-investment in
physical capital due to the hold-up problem as noted previously. The fixed cost of job
creation is subject to the same hold-up problem for it is also sunk before job matches
are formed, which tends to cause suboptimal job creation. There is an opposing
distortion that is the negative externality a firm imposes on others when posting a
job vacancy. The negative externality arises out of the fact that the creation of an
additional vacancy lowers the probability that other vacancies are filled, which tends
to cause excessive job creation in equilibrium.10 Under monopoly in equipment, there
is a fourth distortion from monopoly pricing. The comparison between monopoly and
competition to follow serves to highlight the eﬀects of this distortion on productivity,
employment and wages. A full-fledge analysis of the eﬃciencies of the various market
structures is postponed to section 5.
4. MONOPOLY IN CAPITAL EQUIPMENT
A. The participation constraint
A firm that monopolizes the production of capital equipment obviously no longer
has to sell at unit cost p (q) = qγ but may instead pick the price schedule p (q)
to maximize profit. The number of machines the monopolist will sell is equal to
the number of job vacancies posted in the downstream competitive industry since
capital investment is made at the moment job vacancies are posted. The profit the
9Perhaps it should not be called a competitive benchmark because the labour markets are not
Walrasian. It is a competitive benchmark relative to the case where the market for machines is
monopolistic.
10Hosios (1990) explains that for any concave matching function, there exists some sharing rule
(β, 1− β) under which the two distortions just cancel out, restoring constrained eﬃciency. Con-
strained eﬃciency is generally not attainable when physical capital investment is subject to the
hold-up problem as well in a bargaining model of wage determination.
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monopolist earns from market s = H and L is thus equal to
πs = vs (ps − qγs ) . (5)
where ps denotes the price charged for machine qs targeted at the market for type s
workers. The prices that the monopolist may charge are limited by the participation
constraints that leave the competitive downstream firms in either labour market with
non-negative expected profits. From (2) , for s = H and L
ps ≤ η (θs) (1− β) hsqs − c. (6)
Fixing the quality qs and the number of machines to sell vs = nsθs, the constraint
defines the maximum price that may be charged. If the constraint holds as an equal-
ity, the competitive downstream producers earn exactly zero expected return on job
creation. When the constraint holds as a strict inequality in one or both markets, the
monopolist is leaving certain demand in the markets concerned unsatisfied and as a
result allows the firms that are not rationed positive expected return on job creation.
This may be optimal for a monopolist that is unable to perfectly price discriminate
between firms in the two markets. Before turning to analyzing the more practical case
of second degree price discrimination, I shall first examine the simpler case in which
the monopolist is assumed to be able to perfectly sort buyers into the two markets.
But first we can show that in either case
Proposition 1 The monopolist will set prices, qualities and quantities such that
there will be fewer job vacancies created for both skill types compared to the bench-
mark of a competitive equipment market. Employment declines as a result. And the
vacancies created will be filled at higher probabilities.
Proof. Let θcs and θms be respectively the market tightness in competition and
monopoly. The monopolist obviously will pick the price, quality and quantity oﬀered
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for sale in each market to earn strictly positive profits for it always has the option to
entirely shut down the market concerned. From (5) and (6) , this implies
η (θms ) (1− β) hsqs − qγs > c (7)
in monopoly. If η (θcs) ≥ η (θms ) ,
c = max
q
{η (θcs) (1− β)hq − qγ} ≥ η (θms ) (1− β) hsqs − qγs
for any qs, which contradicts (7). We must then have η (θcs) < η (θms ) and θcs > θms .
B. The perfectly discriminating monopolist
The monopolist’s total profit from the two markets may be written as
Π = nHθH (pH − qγH) + nLθL (pL − q
γ
L) . (8)
With the numbers of workers in the two markets given, the profit maximization is
over the qualities (qH , qL) and the quantities (vH , vL) = (nHθH , nLθL) of machines to
oﬀer for sale and the price to charge (pH , pL) subject to the participation constraints
(6) . For each (qs, θs) pair, s = H and L, the participation constraints define the max-
imum prices that may be charged. In the absence of the necessity to be concerned
with incentive compatibility in second degree price discrimination, the perfectly dis-
criminating monopolist finds it optimal to charge just the maximum since the profit
from either market is increasing in the price charged, other things equal. Substituting
the constraints as equalities into (8) yields
Π = nHθH (η (θH) (1− β)hHqH − c− qγH)+nLθL (η (θL) (1− β) hLqL − c− q
γ
L) . (9)
The participation constraints may be thought of as the inverse demand curves. Fixing
the qualities of the machines to oﬀer for sale, the demand curves are downward sloping
as increases in the number of machines that may be sold vs = nsθs would come at
the expense of a lower price given that η is a decreasing function.
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Taking first order conditions of (9) with respect to qs, s = H and L yields exactly
(3) that applies when the market for machines is competitive. Hence, were the η (θs)’s
identical across the two market structures, the monopolist would be oﬀering machines
of the same quality that are chosen in competition. But the η (θs)’s are not identical
across the two market structures. In marking up prices above unit production costs,
monopoly pricing results in lower job creation in equilibrium, raising the η (θs)’s in
the process.11 Specifically the first order condition of (9) with respect to θs is
(η (θs) (1− β)hsqs − c− qγs ) + θsη0 (θs) (1− β)hsqs = 0.
Plugging (3) into the above for qs yieldsÃ
(1− β) ηs (θs)hs
γ
! γ
γ−1
(γ (1 + εη (θs))− 1) = c (10)
where εη (θ) = θη0 (θ) /η (θ) < 0 denotes the elasticity of η with respect to θ. I should
impose the following regularity conditions on the matching function to ensure that
the monopolist’s profit maximization is well-defined.
Assumption 1 :
(a) γ (1 + εη (θ))− 1 > 0 for some θ.
(b) εη (θ) is non-increasing in θ.
The first part of the assumption is necessary for there to exist some positive θ that
solves (10). The second part, in guaranteeing that the left side of the first order
11In the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model and much of the literature that follows, a perfectly
discriminating monopolist will oﬀer the same quality as under competition but charges a price to
extract all the surplus from the buyers. In the present analysis, it is not possible for a perfectly
discriminating monopolist to break up the price decision from the quality decision. When the
monopolist charges higher prices, the expected returns on job creation decline and the zero profit
conditions are restored only when few vacancies are posted, with each vacancy filled with a higher
probability. Once this happens, firms would like to invest in higher quality machines as they would
be employed more often. And in turn the monopolist would find it optimal to supply higher quality
machines as this allows more surplus to be extracted.
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condition for maximum is downward sloping, ensures suﬃciency. If the matching
function is CES, this condition is satisfied if the elasticity of substitution between the
two inputs is not greater than unity. Specifically, ∂εη (θ) /∂θ ≤ 0 if and only if the
elasticity of substitution of the matching function σ ≤ 1.
The first order condition (10) implies that, under assumption 1(b), η (θs) is de-
creasing in hs and so θH > θL. Hence just as in the competitive benchmark, high skill
workers enjoy better employment prospects. While there are fewer jobs created for
both skill types compared to competition, the jobs created are better jobs.
Proposition 2 The perfectly discriminating monopolist oﬀers better quality machines
for sale in either market, resulting in higher productivity and wages for both skill types.
The workers are worse oﬀ nevertheless as expected earnings fall below the competitive
benchmark.
Proof. Machine qualities are given by the same equation (3) that holds in either
competition or perfect price discrimination. Proposition 1 establishes that there would
be fewer jobs created in monopoly, i.e. θms < θcs and therefore η (θms ) > η (θcs) . The
machines oﬀered by the monopolist must then be of higher qualities than the machines
chosen in competition. Wages are given by
ws = βhsqs (11)
that are increasing in productivity and hence would be higher when firms invest in
more productive equipment. Expected earnings are given by
E [ws] = µ (θs)βhsqs = θsηs (θs)βhsqs.
Substituting in (3) for qs yields
E [ws] = θs (hsη (θs))
γ
1−γ
Ã
(1− β)
γ
! 1
1−γ
β (12)
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which can be shown to be increasing in θs under assumption 1(a). The lowering of θs
in monopoly thus results in falling expected earnings.
In competition, firms posting vacancies for either skill type invest in machines of the
same quality in equilibrium. Would the monopolist find it optimal to diﬀerentiate the
two markets? There is no unambiguous ranking of demand for quality between firms
in the two markets in the present model, unlike the standard setup in the monopoly
pricing literature in which the markets can be ranked in terms of the demand for
quality. Even though the marginal product of machine quality is greater if production
is undertaken with high skill workers, firms creating vacancies for these workers do
not necessarily have greater demand for quality. For the demand also depends on the
probability that the vacancy will be filled. More precisely, the demand for quality is
given by the multiple η (θs) hs which the monopolist can influence through controlling
the quantity in the market concerned. Whether it is optimal for the monopolist to
choose a selling strategy to result in η (θH) hH > η (θL) hL depends on the properties
of the matching function.
Proposition 3 If εη (θs) is constant, the perfectly discriminating monopolist finds it
optimal to set η (θH) hH = η (θL) hL and oﬀer machines of the same quality to the two
markets at identical prices. If εη (θs) is decreasing, the monopolist finds it optimal to
set η (θH) hH > η (θL) hL and oﬀer higher quality machines to the high skill market
at a higher price.
Proof. With machine qualities given by (3) , we have
qH
qL
=
Ã
η (θH) hH
η (θL) hL
! 1
γ−1
=
Ã
γ (1 + εη (θL))− 1
γ (1 + εη (θH))− 1
! 1
γ
(13)
where the second inequality obtains after substituting from (10) . If εη (θs) is constant,
qH = qL. If εη (θs) is decreasing, qH > qL since θH > θL. Setting the participation
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constraints as equalities and substituting from (3) yields
ps =
Ã
η (θs)hs (1− β)
γ
! γ
γ−1
γ − c
which is strictly increasing in machine qualities by virtue of (3) again. Hence, if the
monopolist finds it optimal to oﬀer the same piece of equipment for sale in either
market, it will find it optimal to charge the same price. If it finds it optimal to oﬀer
more productive machines for sale in the high skill market, it will charge a higher
price for it.
That market power in the market for capital equipment makes workers worse oﬀ is
perhaps not surprising. The more interesting question is how the two skill types fare
relative to each other.
Proposition 4 If εη (θ) is constant, perfect price discrimination has no eﬀects on the
wage premium wH/wL, the relative rate of employment µ (θH) /µ (θL) and the ratio of
expected earnings E [wH ] /E [wL] relative to the corresponding levels in competition. If
εη (θ) is decreasing, the wage premium is inflated while the relative rate of employment
and the ratio of expected earnings may rise or fall below the corresponding levels in
competition.
Proof. The wage premium is wH/wL = hHqH/hLqL by virtue of (11) . If εη (θ) is
constant, qH = qL in either competition or perfect price discrimination and so the
wage premium is left unaﬀected. If εη (θ) is decreasing, qH > qL that will raise the
wage premium above the level in competition. The relative rate of employment may
be written as
µ (θH)
µ (θL)
=
θHη (θH)
θLη (θL)
=
η−1
³
ηH
ηL ηL
´
η−1 (ηL)
ηH
ηL
(14)
where η−1 denotes the inverse function of η and ηs = η (θs) . In competition, ηH/ηL =
hL/hH by virtue of (4), whereas in perfect price discrimination
ηH
ηL
=
hL
hH
Ã
γ (1 + εη (θL))− 1
γ (1 + εη (θH))− 1
!γ−1
γ
(15)
17
by virtue of (13) . If εη (θ) is constant, the above reduces to ηH/ηL = hL/hH also and
fixing ηH/ηL, (14) is independent of ηL. Then perfect price discrimination has no
eﬀects on µ (θH) /µ (θL) . The ratio of expected earnings is given by
E [wH ]
E [wL]
=
µ (θH)
µ (θL)
wH
wL
.
If εη (θ) is constant, neither the relative rate of employment nor the wage premium
is aﬀected by perfect price discrimination and so the same conclusion on the ratio of
expected earnings follows.
If εη (θ) is decreasing, (15) implies that ηH/ηL would exceed hL/hH since θL < θH .
The increase in ηH/ηL has a negative eﬀect on the relative rate of employment as
given by (14) under assumption 1(a). When fewer vacancies are created in monopoly,
θL is lowered, raising ηL which would have a positive eﬀect on the relative rate of
employment as given by (14) if εη (θ) is decreasing. No general conclusion is available
as to whether the positive or the negative eﬀect will dominate. The ambiguity carries
over to the ratio of expected earnings.
In case εη (θ) is constant, perfect price discrimination clearly would not be making
one skill type worse oﬀ relative to the other. While it is true that the wage premium
is inflated in case εη (θ) is strictly decreasing, perfect price discrimination similarly
has no systematic eﬀects on the welfare of one skill type relative to the other since
the eﬀect on the ratio of expected earnings is ambiguous. Unless workers are risk-
inclined, the possible decline in the relative rate of employment could certainly make
high skill workers relatively worse oﬀ despite the increase in the wage premium. The
general conclusion is then there is no systematic tendency for either skill type to suﬀer
particularly more than the other under perfect price discrimination. This result would
be overturned in second degree price discrimination to which we now turn.
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C. Second degree price discrimination
We now drop the unrealistic assumption that the monopolist can sort firms posting
vacancies for diﬀerent skill types into distinct markets. Absent the ability to perfectly
price discriminate, the monopolist will have to rely on the downstream competitive
firms to self—select themselves into the appropriate markets. To do so, the price—
quality pairs have to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints:
η (θH) (1− β) hHqH − pH ≥ η (θH) (1− β) hHqL − pL, (16)
η (θL) (1− β) hLqL − pL ≥ η (θL) (1− β) hLqH − pH (17)
which would ensure that firms creating vacancies for the particular skill type indeed
prefer to invest in the type of machines targeted at the particular market. If εη (θ) is
constant, the perfectly discriminating monopolist finds it optimal to oﬀer the piece
of equipment for sale in either market at identical prices, which clearly involves no
incentive compatible problems. In this case, first and second degree price discrimina-
tions are equivalent as the monopolist finds it optimal not to price discriminate. The
more interesting situation is when the monopolist does find it optimal to diﬀerentiate
between the two markets in its unconstrained profit maximization. Substituting the
participation constraints holding as equalities into (16) and (17) yields respectively
0 ≥ (1− β) qL (η (θH)hH − η (θL) hL) , (18)
0 ≥ (1− β) qH (η (θL)hL − η (θH) hH) . (19)
In perfect price discrimination, if εη (θ) is strictly decreasing, we have from proposition
2: qH > qL and η (θH) hH > η (θL)hL. Hence the price—quality pairs in first degree
price discrimination are not incentive compatible for the high skill market.
Results from the monopoly pricing literature suggest that it would be optimal for
the monopolist to meet incentive compatibility by leaving some positive surplus to
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high demand buyers which in this case are firms creating vacancies for high skill
workers while continuing extracting the maximum surplus from low demand buyers
that are firms creating vacancies for low skill workers. The maximization of (8) subject
to (16) , (17) and the participation constraints in (6) under the assumption that εη (θ)
is strictly decreasing does yield a solution in which firms posting vacancies for low
skill workers would continue earning zero expected surplus, whereas firms posting
vacancies for high skill workers are left with a certain positive expected surplus. As
expected, we have the solution satisfying (η (θH) hH , qH , pH) > (η (θL)hL, qL, pL) .
And then the machines oﬀered to the low skill market are of lower quality than the
machines chosen in competition whereas the machines oﬀered to the high skill market
are of higher quality than the machines chosen in competition. (To the referee: the
calculations are in appendix A at the back of the paper.)
Yet this is not the solution of second degree price discrimination in the present
model as it is not exactly incentive compatible. Specifically, with free entry in job
creation and if firms in the high skill market are left with some positive expected
surplus, there would be unmet demand and thus non-price rationing for high quality
machines. The rationed firms may then turn to investing in the machines targeted
at the low skill market. There would be positive surplus to be earned from doing so
since
η (θH) (1− β)hHqL − pL > η (θL) (1− β) hLqL − pL = c (20)
if η (θH)hH > η (θL)hL. Now so long as
η (θH) (1− β) hHqL − pL > c (21)
there would be unsatisfied demand for the machines targeted at the low skill market
from firms creating jobs for high skill workers. There can then be no possible mech-
anisms for the monopolist to supply entirely the rationed demand in the high skill
market with the machines target at the low skill market if it is to condition the θs’s
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such that η (θH) hH > η (θL) hL. That is the case because the last equality in (20) and
η (θH) (1− β) hHqL − pL = c
cannot both hold unless η (θH) hH = η (θL) hL. Hence, if it remains optimal to supply
at least some of the firms in the high skill market with a more productive machine
that would be the case if and only if η (θH)hH > η (θL) hL, there will have to be
non-price rationing of the machines targeted at the low skill market as well.
In such a scheme, even firms trying to create vacancies for low skill workers would
be rationed. This is because if (21) continues to hold, the demand for the low quality
machines from firms planning to hire high skill workers would be infinite. Then not
all firms, including firms planning to hire low skill workers, that attempt to invest
in the low quality machines would sure to have their demand met. As a result, even
the last equality in (20) would turn into a strict inequality. And firms that are not
rationed would earn some positive expected surplus.
Most of all, no such schemes would work at all. No downstream competitive firms
would invest in the machines targeted at the low skill market to create vacancies for
low skill workers if η (θH) hH > η (θL)hL. For in this case, the expected surplus of
employing the same machine for creating vacancies for high skill workers stays higher.
No job creation will take place in the low skill market then. But if it is not optimal
to serve the low skill market, not extracting the maximum surplus from firms in the
high skill market cannot be optimal in the first place. In all, leaving some positive
expected surplus for firms in the high skill market cannot be an incentive compatible
and optimal mechanism.12
12Is it possible to solve the problem by oﬀering a price-quality pair specifically for the rationed
buyers in the high skill market? Suppose the monopolist oﬀers three quality-price pairs (qH , pH) >
(qR, pR) > (qL, pL) . The sale of highest quality machines remains rationed with
η (θH) (1− β)hHqH − pH > c
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In ruling out the optimality of allowing firms in the high skill market some positive
surplus, the incentive compatibility constraints must take on the forms of (18) and
(19) . The only possibility for both constraints to be met is that
η (θH) hH = η (θL) hL (22)
With the participation constraints holding as equalities, the profit function in (8)
simplifies to
Π = nHθH (η (θH) (1− β) hHqH − c− qγH) +
nLη−1 (η (θH)hH/hL) (η (θH) (1− β)hHqL − c− qγL) (23)
after substituting in (22) . Not unexpectedly, with η (θH)hH = η (θL)hL, the first
order conditions with respect to qH and qL imply that the monopolist finds it optimal
not to discriminate between the two markets but to oﬀer for sale the same piece of
equipment. In fact, (23) implies that as in perfect price discrimination, qH (= qL) is
given by the same equation (3) that applies in competition.
Proposition 5 If the monopolist may only use price-quality pairs to discriminate
between the two markets, the only incentive compatible scheme involves extracting all
expected surplus from firms in either market by oﬀering the same piece of equipment
to the two markets at the same price.
while
η (θH) (1− β)hHqR − pR = c
so that the rationed firms’ demand would be entirely met by the (qR, pR) pair. To satisfy incentive
compatibility
η (θH) (1− β)hHqR − pR ≥ η (θH) (1− β)hHqL − pL
But the right side exceeds the right side of (20). Then the (qR, pR) pair cannot possibly extract all
expected surplus from firms in the high skill market. There will have to be rationing in the sale of
the (qR, pR) pair as well and there continues to be unsatisfied demand spilling over to the market
for the (qL, pL) pair. The problem of the low skill market not being served remains unresolved.
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Proof. The first part of the proposition follows from the discussion above. Charging
diﬀerent prices for the same equipment in the two markets is clearly not incentive
compatible. The steps that lead to the specification in (23) do however ensure incen-
tive compatibility.
Furthermore, proposition 2 continues to hold in second degree price discrimination.
Proposition 6 In second degree price discrimination, the monopolist will oﬀer better
quality machines for sale in either market in comparison to competition, resulting
in higher productivity and wages for both skill types. The workers are worse oﬀ
nevertheless as expected earnings fall below the level in competition.
Proof. Identical to the proof of proposition 2.
What diﬀers from first degree price discrimination is that there are now unambigu-
ous eﬀects on how one skill type fares relative the other in comparison to competition.
Proposition 7 In second degree price discrimination, the wage premium wH/wL
remains at the corresponding level in competition. And if εη (θ) is strictly decreas-
ing, the relative rate of employment µ (θH) /µ (θL) and the ratio of expected earnings
E [wH ] /E [wL] would exceed the respective levels in competition. As a result, low skill
workers would be made relatively worse oﬀ.
Proof. In both competition and second degree price discrimination, qH = qL and so
the wage premium, given by wH/wL = hHqH/hLqL, is left unaﬀected. Binding incen-
tive compatibility arising from a strictly decreasing εη (θ) results in η (θH) /η (θL) =
hH/hL, the value that obtains in competition. By (14) , the relative rates of employ-
ment would diﬀer between the two market structures in as much as η (θL) has risen
in second degree price discrimination. If εη (θ) is strictly decreasing, the eﬀect can
be shown to be positive. With the wage premium staying unchanged, the ratio of
expected earnings would rise above the level in competition due to the increase in the
relative rate of employment.
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In picking qualities and prices to satisfy incentive compatibility, the monopolist’s
pricing decision would cause the employment prospect of low skill workers to suﬀer
relatively more than the employment prospect of high skill workers in comparison
to the benchmark of perfect competition. Specifically, in competition, only when
(cH/cL)
γ−1
γ < hH/hL holds that low skill workers will suﬀer a bleaker employment
prospect. In second degree price discrimination, there tends to be relatively fewer
jobs for low skill workers even if hH/hL = (cH/cL)
γ−1
γ in which case there can be no
diﬀerence in the rates of employment under competition. In this way, market power
intensifies low skill unemployment.
Taking first order condition of (23) with respect to θH and substituting in (3) for
qH (= qL) yieldsÃ
(1− β) η (θH)hH
γ
! γ
γ−1


γ

1 + εη (θH)
nH + nL
θL
θH
nH + nL
dθL
dθH

− 1


 = c (24)
where θL and dθL/dθH are implicitly defined by (22) . Previously in competition and
in first degree price discrimination, both absolute and relative market sizes as given
by (nH , nL) and nH/nL respectively have no eﬀects on employment, productivity and
wages. In second degree price discrimination, (24) shows that the model is still scale
free for proportional increases in nH and nL. But now the relative market size as
given by nH/nL apparently does influence equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 8 In second degree price discrimination and if εη (θ) is strictly decreas-
ing, an increase in the relative supply of high skill workers results in more productive
equipment oﬀered for sale, raising wages, while dampening job creation and lowering
the rates of employment and expected earnings for both skill types.
Proof. If εη (θ) is strictly decreasing, the left side of (24) is decreasing in nH/nL and
θH .13 This implies dθH/d
³
nH
nL
´
< 0 and by (22) θL is also decreasing in nH/nL. By
13This guarantees that the condition is also suﬃcient for maximum.
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(3) and then by (11), the positive eﬀects on qH (= qL), wH and wL follow. Expected
earnings, given by (12), decline because of the decrease in θs.
The single quality oﬀered in second degree price discrimination is a compromise of
the two distinct qualities in perfect price discrimination. Where exactly the compro-
mise should lie between the two distinct qualities depends on the relative importance
of the two markets. An increase in the relative size of the high skill market, in turning
this market more important for the monopolist, would induce the firm to pick a more
productive machine for sale. That is the case because a more productive machine
helps the monopolist extract greater surplus from each firm in the high skill market.
The increases in productivity then raise wages. In the meantime, the downstream
competitive firms would willingly purchase the more productive machine at a higher
price only if the vacancies are filled at high probabilities. Thus the decline in job cre-
ation and employment. Expected earnings fall as the negative eﬀects on employment
dominate the positive eﬀects on wages.
The proposition implies that a decline in the relative supply of low skill workers
will lower the workers’ employment and expected earnings. The practical implication
is that when more of the population acquire skills, the remaining low skill workers
become worse oﬀ. This is a peculiar result for it contradicts what one would have
expected from a standard demand and supply analysis that decreases in the relative
supply of a factor will raise the factor’s return. But then since the employment and
expected earnings of high skill workers are also adversely aﬀected by the same decline
in the relative supply of low skill workers. And if it happens that the eﬀects on high
skill workers are more pronounced, the result may not be so peculiar after all. This
however is not the case. The decline in the relative supply of low skill workers does
harm low skill workers more so than high skill workers.
Proposition 9 In second degree price discrimination and if εη (θ) is strictly de-
creasing, an increase in the relative supply of high skill workers results in increases
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in the relative rate of employment µ (θH) /µ (θL) and the ratio if expected earnings
E [wH ] /E [wL].
Proof. The relative rate of employment as given in (14) would be aﬀected by the
relative supply in as much as η (θL) varies with nH/nL since η (θH) /η (θL) remains at
hL/hH throughout. The positive eﬀect on µ (θH) /µ (θL) follows because the increase
in η (θL) that is due to the decline in θL has a positive eﬀect on (14) if εη (θ) is
strictly decreasing. The ratio of expected earnings, given by the product of wH/wL
and µ (θH) /µ (θL) , rises too for the first ratio remains at hH/hL, independent of the
relative supply of workers.
That an increase in the relative supply of high skill workers will result in deteri-
orating employment prospects for low skill workers is not a novel result in the job
matching literature. In Saint-Paul (1996) and Acemoglu (1997), the hiring of low
skill workers involves the opportunity cost of giving up the option that the firm may
recruit the more productive high skill workers. There will be such opportunity costs
if job creation exhibits decreasing returns in the aggregate. Increases in the relative
supply of high skill workers raise the opportunity cost as the prospect of successfully
recruiting the more productive high skill workers improves when the supply is more
abundant. Filling the job vacancy with low skill workers thus becomes more costly to
firms. In these models, the fortunes of high and low skill workers resemble a zero-sum
game. More jobs for one skill type are at the expense of less jobs for the other skill
type. In the present model, there are more or there are less jobs for both skill types
simultaneously when the relative supply varies. This diﬀerence makes it possible to
distinguish between the two theories. For example, we may track over time whether
the employment of both skill types has risen or declined together or whether the
employment of high skill workers has risen in the midst of falling employment for low
skill workers as the relative supply of high skill workers increases.
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5. SOCIAL OPTIMALITY
A social planner would maximize the net output that workers belonging to each
skill type may produce.
Ws = max{qs,θs} {ns (µ (θs)hsqs − θs (c+ q
γ
s ))} .
The necessary conditions for optimum are
qs =
Ã
η (θs) hs
γ
! 1
γ−1
,
Ã
η (θs)hs
γ
! γ
γ−1
(γ (1 + εη (θs))− 1) = c.
As in perfect price discrimination, social optimality calls for the same piece of equip-
ment to be sold in either market if εη (θ) is constant whereas high skill workers
should be equipped with more productive equipment in case εη (θ) is strictly decreas-
ing. With the help of (3) , (4) and (10) and (24), we may summarize how capital
intensity and job creation in the each market structure diﬀer from the social optimum
in table 1.
Table 1: The comparison of capital intensity and job creation of various
market structures with social optimality
qH qL θH θL
Competition − − +/− +/−
Perfect price discrimination,
(a) constant εη (θ) 0 0 − −
(b) decreasing εη (θ) − − − −
Second degree price discrimination
with a decreasing εη (θ) − +/− +/− −
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In table 1, a − sign denotes the variable in the market structure concerned falling
short of optimality, a + sign denotes the variable exceeding optimality, a +/− means
that the comparison is ambiguous and a 0 means that the variable coincides exactly
with optimality.
That the quality of the machine chosen in competition is suboptimal is due to the
holdup problem noted previously. That job creation may be suboptimal is due to
the fact that the fixed cost of job creation is subject to the same holdup problem as
well. That it may be excessive is due to the negative externality arising from the fact
that an additional vacancy lowers the probability that other vacancies are filled. The
overall eﬀect on job creation is ambiguous.
The perfectly discriminating monopolists, in controlling the numbers of vacancies
that may be created through its pricing policy, internalizes the negative externality.
Only the distortion arising from the holdup problem associated with the fixed cost
of job creation remains and this unambiguously lowers job creation below optimality.
In case εη (θ) is constant, the positive eﬀect of monopoly pricing on machine qualities
exactly cancel out the negative eﬀect of the holdup problem, restoring optimality in
the quality choice. In case εη (θ) is decreasing, the negative eﬀects of the holdup
problem dominates, leaving overall negative eﬀects on machine qualities.
In second degree price discrimination, the monopolist in picking a machine quality
lying somewhere in-between the two qualities in perfect price discrimination, lowers
the quality in the high skill market below the quality in perfect price discrimination.
Since the quality in the latter is suboptimal to begin with, the machine quality in
second degree price discrimination is likewise suboptimal. A similar conclusion on
low skill job creation applies as firms hiring low skill workers will be required to
purchase more costly equipment than in perfect price discrimination and low skill
job creation in the latter is suboptimal in the first place. On the other hand, that
firms hiring high skill workers may now invest in less costly equipment raises high
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skill job creation in second degree price discrimination above high skill job creation
in perfect price discrimination. If the increase is suﬃciently pronounced, it may even
rise above high skill job creation in social optimum. But that can only happen if
high skill job creation in competition happens to be excessive since job creation in
price discrimination of any degrees falls short of job creation in competition. The
comparison of machine quality in the low skill market may be interpreted similarly.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
How product market competition aﬀects the labour market is a relatively unex-
ploited question that deserves more attention. In this paper, I study a channel in
which monopoly in capital equipment hurts workers in general and more so for low
skill workers. The empirical importance of the channel remains to be seen. But this
should not be a diﬃcult task as it only involves checking whether product market
competition in the upstream industry has any eﬀects on the relative rate of employ-
ment between high skill and low skill workers in the downstream industry.
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APPENDIX (NOT TO BE CONSIDERED FOR PUBLICATION)
A. The hypothetical solution of second degree price discrimination
In this section, I prove the claim in the main text that the maximization of
Π = nHθH (pH − qγH) + nLθL (pL − q
γ
L)
subject to the participation constraints:
η (θH) (1− β) hHqH − pH ≥ c, (25)
η (θL) (1− β)hLqL − pL ≥ c (26)
and the incentive compatibility constraints:
η (θH) (1− β) hHqH − pH ≥ η (θH) (1− β) hHqL − pL, (27)
η (θL) (1− β) hLqL − pL ≥ η (θL) (1− β) hLqH − pH (28)
results in firms posting vacancies in the high skill market enjoying a certain positive
surplus if it is optimal for the monopolist to discriminate between the two markets.
Call this problem M.
For the participation constraints may hold as strict inequalities, the monopolist in
general can pick the quantity independently of the price and quality of the machines
oﬀered for sale in each market. Formally, the choice variables are {qH , pH , θH , qL, pL, θL}.
The choices of {θH , θL} are merely choices of quantities of machines to be sold as
vs = nsθs.We proceed by assuming that incentive compatibility is not binding in the
low skill market under which we can ignore (28) . Then increases in pL not only will
raise the monopolist’s profit, other things equal, but will also enlarge the choice set
defined by (27) . Hence if incentive compatibility for the low skill market is indeed
not binding, (26) must hold as an equality in the monopolist’s profit maximization.
Next rewrite (25) as
η (θH) (1− β)hHqH − pH − x = c (29)
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for some x ≥ 0 to allow for the monopolist leaving a certain positive surplus for firms
in the high skill market. Plugging the above and (26) holding as an equality into (27)
yields
x ≥ qL (1− β) (η (θH)hH − η (θL) hL) (30)
Plugging (29) and (26) holding as an equality into the profit function yields
Π = nHθH (η (θH) (1− β) hHqH − x− c− qγH) + nLθL (η (θL) (1− β) hLqL − c− q
γ
L) .
(31)
Assuming incentive compatibility in the low skill market is not binding and employ-
ing an additional variable x, we simplify M to the maximization of (31) subject to
(30) and where the choice variables are now {qH , x, θH , qL, θL} . Denoting λ as the
Lagrangian multiplier associated with (30), the first order conditions are
qH : η (θH) (1− β) hH − γqγ−1H = 0, (32)
qL : nLθL
³
η (θL) (1− β) hL − γqγ−1L
´
− λ (1− β) (η (θH)hH − η (θL) hL) = 0, (33)
x : −nHθH + λ ≤ 0, x ≥ 0, (34)
λ : x ≥ qL (1− β) (η (θH)hH − η (θL) hL) , λ ≥ 0, (35)
θH : nH (η (θH) (1− β)hHqH − x− c− qγH + θHη0 (θH) (1− β)hHqH)−
λ (1− β) qLη0 (θH)hH = 0, (36)
θL : nL (η (θL) (1− β) hLqL − c− qγL + θLη0 (θL) (1− β)hLqL)−
λ (1− β) qLη0 (θL)hL = 0. (37)
A priori, we do not know for sure whether incentive compatibility will be binding
and whether it is optimal for the monopolist to leave a certain surplus to firms in the
high skill market. And so we have made allowance for x and λ to be corner solutions
in the above.
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Suppose incentive compatibility is not binding. In this case, λ = 0. Then it follows
from (34) that x = 0 too. Equations (32) is identical to the corresponding first
order condition in the unconstrained solution in the first place and with λ = 0, the
same conclusion on (33) , (36) and (37) follows. If εη (θ) is constant, the analysis of
perfect price discrimination in the text indicates that η (θH) hH − η (θL)hL = 0, thus
satisfying (35). This verifies that incentive compatibility is in fact not binding in this
case.14
But with a strictly decreasing εη (θ), the unconstrained solution would violate in-
centive compatibility in the high skill market. In this case, λ > 0 and (35) holds as an
equality. Our task is to show that it is optimal for the monopolist to set x > 0. To do
so, we momentarily drop the non-negativity constraint on x to allow counterfactually
that x may take on negative values. Then (34) must hold as an equality and hence
λ = nHθH . This turns (36) into
η (θH) (1− β) hHqH − x− c− qγH + θH (1− β) η0 (θH) hH (qH − qL) = 0. (38)
If x ≤ 0 holds in the absence of the non-negativity constraint, we have from (35) , η (θH)hH−
η (θL) hL ≤ 0. And then by (32) and (33) , qL ≥ qH under which we must have
η (θH) (1− β) hHqH − x − c − qγH ≤ 0 for (38) to be satisfied. Yet, as the per unit
revenue the monopolist earns in the high skill market, this clearly must be strictly
positive in the optimal solution. This proves that x > 0 in the monopolist’s profit
maximization. Then by (35)
η (θH) hH − η (θL)hL > 0 (39)
and by (32) and (33)
qH > qL. (40)
14The incentive compatibility constraint in the low skill market is d ≥
qH (1− β) (η (θL)hL − η (θH)hH) where d denotes the surplus the monopolist may leave to
firms in the low skill market. This clearly is also satisfied with d = 0.
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Next we turn to incentive compatibility in the low skill market. Substituting (26)
and (30) holding as equalities and (29) into (28) , we have the incentive compatibility
constraint in the low skill market simplified to
0 ≥ (1− β) (qH − qL) (η (θL) hL − η (θH)hL)
which holds with strict inequality by virtue of (39) and (40) . Our previous pre-
sumption that incentive compatibility in the low skill market is not binding is hence
justified.
Finally, we may show that the monopolist oﬀers a more productive machine in
the high skill market than the machine chosen in competition but a less productive
machine in the low skill market. First, recall from proposition 1 in the main text that
in all cases, θms < θcs for s = H and L where the superscript m stands for monopoly
and c for competition. For the high skill market, we have the machine quality given
by (32) in either market structure and with η (θmH) > η (θcH), the claim follows. To
prove the claim for the low skill market, we define
q0 = argmax
q
{η (θmL ) (1− β) hLq − qγ} . (41)
With λ > 0 and by (33) and (39) , qmL < q0. Suppose contrary to the claim we have
instead qmL ≥ qcL. Then
η (θmL ) (1− β) hLqcL − (qcL)
γ ≤ η (θmL ) (1− β) hLqmL − (qmL )
γ = c
where the inequality follows from the strict concavity of the function defined in (41)
and the fact that qmL < q
0. Yet since η (θmL ) > η (θcL) ,
η (θmL ) (1− β) hLqcL − (qcL)
γ > η (θcL) (1− β) hLqcL − (qcL)
γ = c.
The hypothesis of qmL ≥ qcL thus results in a contradiction and the claim for the low
skill market follows.
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B. Post-match Investment
B1. Environment.–
In this appendix, I repeat the analysis in the main text under the alternative timing
assumption that firms may purchase the capital equipment only after jobs are filled.
The purpose is to show that the more important results survive the change in the
timing assumption. Specifically, now assume that the order of events is as follows:
(i) Firms pay c to post a vacancy for either H or L workers.
(ii) Matches are formed and firms whose vacancies are filled may proceed to invest
in physical capital.
(iii) Production commences and the worker-firm pair divides the surplus.
In the second stage, the worker-firm pair in the market for type s = H and L workers
makes the investment choice via
Js = max
q
{hsq − p (q)} . (42)
Because investment in physical capital is made only after job matches are formed, the
appropriable surplus is just the net output of the job match. The expected return on
job creation is thus
R (θs) = η (θs) (1− β) Js − c. (43)
B2. Competitive benchmark.–
In the competitive benchmark with p (q) = qγ , solving (42) yields
qs =
Ã
hs
γ
! 1
γ−1
. (44)
Given that investment is undertaken after job matches are formed, the investment
choice is eﬃcient. In equilibrium, the expected return on job creation is driven down
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to 015
η (θs) (1− β)
Ã
hs
γ
! γ
γ−1
(γ − 1) = c. (45)
With hH > hL, (45) implies that θH > θL and so high skill workers do enjoy better
employment prospects. As expected, we have wH > wL as well. That is the case
since wages as given by
ws = βJs = β
Ã
hs
γ
! γ
γ−1
(γ − 1) (46)
are solely functions of the workers’ innate productivity.
B3. Monopoly.–
The number of machines that will be sold in a market is equal to the number of
filled vacancies vsη (θs) = nsθsη (θs) . The monopolist’s profit function is given by
Π = nHθHη (θH) (pH − qγH)− nLθLη (θL) (pL − q
γ
L) . (47)
The profit maximization is subject to the participation constraints that the down-
stream competitive firms earn non-negative expected return on job creation. From
(42) and (43) , the price to charge cannot exceed:
ps ≤ hsqs −
c
η (θs) (1− β)
. (48)
We can first establish that proposition 1 in the main text continues to hold
Proposition 10 The monopolist will set prices, qualities and quantities such that
there will be fewer job vacancies created for both skill types compared to the benchmark
of a perfectly competitive equipment market. Employment declines as a result. And
the vacancies created will be filled at higher probabilities.
15A positive number of jobs are created in equilibrium if and only if (1− β)
³
hs
γ
´ γ
γ−1
(γ − 1) > c
which I assume to hold throughout.
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Proof. Let θcs and θms be respectively the market tightness in competition and
monopoly for market s. The monopolist obviously will pick the price, quality and
quantity oﬀered for sale in each market to earn strictly positive profits for it always
has the option to entirely shut down the market concerned. From (47) and (48) , this
implies
hsqs −
c
η (θs) (1− β)
− qγs > 0 (49)
in monopoly. If if η (θcs) ≥ η (θms ) ,
0 = max
q
{hsq − qγ}− cη (θcs) (1− β)
≥ hsqs −
c
η (θs) (1− β)
− qγs
for any qs, which contradicts (49). We must then have η (θcs) < η (θms ) and θcs > θms .
We first analyze perfect price discrimination. The right side of (48) defines the
maximum price that may be charged for a given (qs, θs) pair. Absent the necessity
to be concerned with incentive compatibility in second degree price discrimination,
the monopolist would find it optimal to charge just the maximum. Substituting (48)
holding as equalities into (47) yields
Π = nHθHη (θH)
Ã
hHqH −
c
η (θH) (1− β)
− qγH
!
+
nLθLη (θL)
Ã
hLqL −
c
η (θL) (1− β)
− qγL
!
. (50)
Proposition 11 In perfect price discrimination, the quality oﬀered to each market
is identical to the quality chosen in competition but at a high price, lowering the
match surplus while leaving no eﬀects on productivity. This cause wages and expected
earnings for both skill types to go down.
Proof. Taking first order condition of (50) with respect to qH and qL yields exactly
(44). Hence there is no diﬀerence in the qualities of machines sold and the productivity
of the job matches across the two market structures. By virtue of (42) , (43) and a
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zero expected return condition on job creation, the prices in competition satisfies
ps = hsqs −
c
η (θs) (1− β)
(51)
that also holds in first degree price discrimination. The lowering of θs in monopoly
pricing raises η (θs) and consequently the right side of the above. Wages, given by
ws = βJs = β (hsqs − ps) (52)
fall below the level in competition as physical capital investment becomes more costly.
Given the decline in the probability of employment due to lower job creation, the same
conclusion on expected earnings, given by
E [ws] = µ (θs) βJs
follows.
Taking first order condition of (50) with respect to θs, s = H and L and then
substituting in (44) for qs yields
η (θs) (1− β) (1 + εη (θs))
Ã
hs
γ
! γ
γ−1
(γ − 1) = c. (53)
I should assume that the regularity conditions on the matching function discussed
in the main text continue to hold, which happens to guarantee that the above is
uniquely solved by some θs as well as suﬃcient for maximum. With εη (θ) non-
increasing, the condition immediately ensures that θH > θL and so high skill workers
continue enjoying better employment prospects. As to how one skill type fares against
the other in comparison to competition, we can show that
Proposition 12 If εη (θ) is constant, perfect price discrimination has no eﬀects on
the wage premium wH/wL, the relative rate of employment µ (θH) /µ (θL) and the ra-
tio of expected earnings E [wH ] /E [wL] relative to the respective levels in competition.
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If εη (θ) is decreasing, the wage premium is lowered while the relative rate of employ-
ment and the ratio of expected earning may rise or fall below the respective levels in
competition.
Proof. By (51) and (52), the wage premium in either competition or perfect price
discrimination is given by
wH
wL
=
Ã
η (θH)
η (θL)
!−1
(54)
By (45)
η (θH)
η (θL)
=
Ã
hL
hH
! γ
γ−1
(55)
in competition and by (53)
η (θH)
η (θL)
=
Ã
hL
hH
! γ
γ−1 1 + εη (θL)
1 + εη (θH)
(56)
in perfect price discrimination. If εη (θ) is constant, (56) reduces to (55) and so the
wage premium stays unaltered. If εη (θ) is decreasing, εη (θL) > εη (θH) and so (56)
exceeds (55), lowering the wage premium. In case εη (θ) is constant, the invariance
of η (θH) /η (θL) across the two market structures implies that the relative rate of
employment µ (θH) /µ (θL) as given by (14) in the main text would change in so far
as η (θL) diﬀers between the two market structures. But precisely when εη (θ) is
constant that (14) is independent of η (θL) for given ηH/ηL. Hence the invariance of
the relative rate of employment. If εη (θ) is decreasing, perfect price discrimination has
no systematic eﬀects on the relative rate of employment in comparison to competition.
In reference to (14) , first there is the negative eﬀect of a higher η (θH) /η (θL) and
then the positive eﬀect of a higher η (θL). No general conclusion is available as
to whether the positive or the negative eﬀect will dominate. If εη (θ) is constant,
neither the relative rate of employment nor the wage premium is aﬀected by perfect
price discrimination and so the same conclusion on the ratio of expected earnings
follows. In case εη (θ) is decreasing, the ambiguity as to how the relative rate of
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employment diﬀers between the two market structures carries over to whether the
ratio of expected earnings in perfect price discrimination would exceed or fall below
the ratio in competition.
In conclusion, perfect price discrimination leaves no eﬀects on machine qualities
and productivity but lowers employment, wages and expected earnings of both skill
types. Nevertheless, one skill type is not particularly adversely aﬀected relative to
the other.
Next, we move on to the case of second degree price discrimination. Absent the
ability to observe the buyers’ types directly, the prices and qualities the monopolist
may pick are restricted by the two incentive compatibility constraints:
hHqH − pH ≥ hHqL − pL, (57)
hLqL − pL ≥ hLqH − pH . (58)
Is first degree price discrimination incentive compatible? To answer the question, we
substitute (51) and (53) into the above yielding respectively
γ − 1
γ

(1 + εη (θH))
Ã
hH
hL
! γ
γ−1
− (1 + εη (θL))

− hH
hL
+ 1 ≥ 0
Ã
γ − 1
γ (1 + εη (θH))− 1
!Ã
hH
hL
! γ
γ−1
+
Ã
hH
hL
! 1
γ−1
− γ − 1γ (1 + εη (θL)) ≤ 0.
The second inequality holds for all hH/hL > 1 given that εη (θL) ≥ εη (θH) and so first
degree price discrimination satisfies incentive compatibility in the low skill market.
Whether or not the first inequality holds depends on the ratio hH/hL as well as on
the shape of the εη (θ) function. Since the left side is non-positive at hH/hL = 1
for εη (θL) ≥ εη (θH) and decreasing in hH/hL for small hH/hL, first degree price
discrimination must fail incentive compatibility in the high skill market for small
hH/hL. For a constant εη (θ), it can be shown that the inequality is satisfied for
hH/hL exceeding some minimum level. Hence in case εη (θ) is constant, first and
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second degree price discriminations are equivalent if and only if the productivity
diﬀerential between the skill types is suﬃciently pronounced.
Does the standard result from the monopoly pricing literature that it is optimal for
the monopolist to satisfy incentive compatibility by leaving a certain positive expected
surplus to high demand buyers that are firms posting vacancies in the high skill
market in the present situation apply? In particular, is it optimal for the monopolist
to leave the participation constraint in (48) in the high skill market holding as a
strict inequality? First, some zero expected return condition on job creation in each
market must hold in the present case with physical capital investment taking place
only after jobs are filled. For job vacancies can be created without first investing
in physical capital. Free entry must then drive down the expected return on job
creation in each market to zero. Now if the monopolist ever tries to restrict output
in not meeting all demand in the market for the high quality machines, then not all
matched firm-worker pairs can go ahead to commence production. Equilibrium in job
creation in the high skill market is characterized by (48) holding as an equality with
η (θH) replaced by uη (θH) for some u denoting the ratio of the number of matched
worker-firm pairs and the number of high quality machines supplied.
Can such rationing policies be optimal for the monopolist? Limiting the supply
may help attaining incentive compatibility in the high skill market in as much as it
may lower pH or raising qH or both. But so long as the changes in prices and qualities
have restored incentive compatibility in the high skill market as given by (57), the
monopolist’s profit is strictly increasing in the number of high quality machines sold.
For a given (pH , qH) pair, the maximum number of machines that can be sold is given
by a θH that solves (48) as an equality. In all, the participation constraints for the
high skill, as well as the low skill, markets must still hold in second degree price
discrimination.
To analyze second degree price discrimination, we can then substituting in the
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participation constraints holding as equalities into the incentive compatibility in the
high skill market (57) yielding
η (θH) ≥ η (θL)
Ã
1 + η (θL) qL (hH − hL)
1− β
c
!−1
. (59)
The profit maximization is thus the maximization of (50) subject to (59) . By mere
inspection, we can see that (44) continues to hold for qH .With incentive compatibility
binding, the first order conditions with respect to qL and θL are respectively
qL =



hL
γ +
1
γθLη (θL)
nH
nL
∂θH
∂qL

η (θH) (1 + εη (θH))
Ã
hH
γ
! γ
γ−1
(γ − 1)− c
1− β





1
γ−1
,
(60)
η (θL) (1 + εη (θL)) (hLqL − qγL)−
c
1− β +
nH
nL
∂θH
∂θL

η (θH) (1 + εη (θH))
Ã
hH
γ
! γ
γ−1
(γ − 1)− c
1− β

 = 0 (61)
where θH , ∂θH/∂qL and ∂θH/∂θL are functions of qL and θL, implicitly defined by
(59) holding as an equality. It can be easily verified that both partials are positive.
Proposition 13 In comparison to the competitive benchmark, second degree price
discrimination with binding incentive compatibility has no eﬀect on the quality in the
high skill market, but lowers the quality in the low skill market. Furthermore, wages
and expected earnings for both skill type are lowered.
Proof. First qL 6= q0L = argmaxq {hLqL − qγL} that is the level in competition and
first degree price discrimination. For if they are equal, (60) and (61) imply that the
price-quality pairs in both markets are identical to the respective price-quality pairs
in first degree price discrimination. And that we presume is not incentive compatible
in the first place. Now suppose qL > q
0
L. Consider what happens when qL is lowered
while θH and θL are held constant. By (59) , this adjustment does not violate incentive
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compatibility if the initial triple of (qL, θH , θL) are incentive compatible. The profit
earned from the high skill matches are not aﬀected by the change with qH and θH
unaltered. The profit earned from the low skill market by virtue of (50) rises instead
with θL unaltered and qL now closer to the ideal of q0L. And so any qL > q0L cannot
be profit maximizing.
Substituting the participation constraints (48) holding as equalities into the wage
equations in (52)
ws =
β
1− β
c
η (θs)
for s = H and L. (62)
The lowering of θs in any monopoly pricing scheme thus also lowers wages in both
markets. The same conclusion on expected earnings follow as the probabilities of
employment are lowered too by the falling market tightness.
Proposition 14 The wage premium wH/wL, the relative rate of employment µ (θH) /µ (θL)
and the ratio of expected earnings E [wH ] /E [wL] in second degree price discrimina-
tion with binding incentive compatibility rise above the respective levels in perfect
price discrimination. If εη (θ) is constant, the same conclusion carries over to the
comparison with competition.
Proof. The proof proceeds by first establishing that second degree price discrimina-
tion with binding incentive compatibility lowers η (θH) /η (θL) below the level in first
degree price discrimination. Suppose θL ≥ θfL and so η (θL) ≤ η
³
θfL
´
where variables
with superscript f denote values in first degree price discrimination. Then
η (θL) (1 + εη (θL)) (hLqL − qγL)−
c
1− β ≤
η
³
θfL
´ ³
1 + εη
³
θfL
´´ ³
hLq
f
L −
³
qfL
´γ´
− c
1− β
since εη (θ) is non-increasing and qfL = argmaxq {hLqL − q} . The second line by (53)
vanishes and this implies the first line is non-positive. And so the second line of (61)
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must be non-negative. But if that is the case, qL ≥ qfL, contradicting proposition 13.
This proves θL < θfL and so η (θL) > η
³
θfL
´
. That qL < q
f
L, by (51), implies that
η (θH) (1 + εη (θH))
Ã
hH
γ
! γ
γ−1
(γ − 1)− c
1− β < 0
= η
³
θfH
´ ³
1 + εη
³
θfH
´´ÃhH
γ
! γ
γ−1
(γ − 1)− c
1− β
where the equality in the second line is again by virtue of (53). It follows then
θH > θfH and η (θH) < η
³
θfH
´
. This establishes η (θH) /η (θL) < η
³
θfH
´
/η
³
θfL
´
.With
the participation constraints continue to hold as equalities in second degree price
discrimination, the wage premium remains at (54). The lowering of η (θH) /η (θL)
thus raises the wage premium above the level in perfect price discrimination. The
relative rate of employment as given by (14) in the main text likewise rises above the
level in perfect price discrimination by the decline in η (θH) /η (θL) and the increase
in η (θL). The same conclusion on the ratio of expected earnings then follows. If
εη (θ) is constant, the wage premium, the relative rate of employment and the ratio
of expected earnings in perfect price discrimination are identical to the respective
values in competition. Thus in this case, second degree price discrimination raises
them all above the respective values in competition.
That εη (θ) is constant is only a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for low
skill workers to be made relatively worse oﬀ in second degree price discrimination in
comparison to competition. In case εη (θ) is strictly decreasing, there does not appear
possible to establish any unambiguous comparisons. On the other hand, the following
proposition on the comparative statics of the relative supply of workers holds so long
as εη (θ) is non-increasing.
Proposition 15 In second degree price discrimination with binding incentive com-
patibility, an increase in the relative supply of high skill workers lowers the quality of
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machines sold in the low skill market and the employment and wages for both skill
types.
Proof. At nH = 0, (60) and (61) imply that qL = q
f
L and θL = θ
f
L. This should be the
case since in the absence of a high skill market, there can be no price discrimination
of any degree. By proposition 13, qL < q
f
L and θL < θ
f
L for any nH > 0. Hence
∂qL/∂nH < 0 and ∂θL/∂nH < 0 must hold for small nH . If the two partials do
not change sign, they will be negative throughout. Now suppose that one or both do
change sign at some nH , then ∂qL/∂nH = 0 or ∂θL/∂nH = 0 or both hold at the point
where the partials become positive. Obviously (60) and (61) require that at least one
of ∂qL/∂nH and ∂θL/∂nH not vanish. Furthermore, the profit function (50) with θH
implicitly defined by (59) holding as an equality must be continuous and concave in
qL and θL at the point of optimum. Hence it cannot be optimal for the monopolist
to only adjust one margin in response to a change in the relative market size. Then
we have both ∂qL/∂nH and ∂θL/∂nH non-zero throughout and ∂qL/∂nH < 0 and
∂θL/∂nH < 0 hold for all nH . The same conclusion on ∂θL/∂nH < 0 follows since the
incentive compatibility constraint holding as an equality defines positive relationships
between qL and θH and between θL and θH . The decline in job creation in either market
lowers employment for both skill types and by (62) also lowers wages.
Proposition 16 In second degree price discrimination with binding incentive com-
patibility and if εη (θ) is constant, an increase in the relative supply of high skill
workers raises the skill premium, the relative rate of employment and the ratio of
expected earnings for suﬃciently small hH/hL.
Proof. Combining (59) holding as an equality, (60) and (61) yields
η (θL)
η (θH)
εη (θL) hL+
Ã
η (θL)
η (θH)
− 1
!³
hL − qγ−1L (1 + εη (θL))
´
−εη (θL) γqγ−1L −hH+hL = 0.
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If εη (θ) is constant, this defines η (θL) /η (θH) as an implicit function of qL only. In
particular,
d (η (θL) /η (θH))
dqL
= (γ − 1) qγ−1L
(η (θL) /η (θH)− 1) (1 + εη) + εηγ
(1 + εη)
³
hL − qγ−1L
´ .
Since we have ∂qL/∂nH < 0, d (η (θL) /η (θH)) /dnH > 0 if and only if the above is
negative. The denominator is positive since qL < q
0
L. Then d (η (θL) /η (θH)) /dqL < 0
if the numerator is negative which is the case for η (θL) /η (θH) suﬃciently close to 1.
This will be the case if the diﬀerence in job creation for the two skill types is small. If
the diﬀerence in productivity is minimal, the diﬀerence in job creation will similarly
be minimal. Increases in η (θL) /η (θH) will raise the wage premium as given by (54) .
The relative rate of employment as given by (14) likewise increases in response to the
increase in η (θL) /η (θH), as well as the increase in η (θL). The same conclusion on
the relative rate of employment then follows.
This proposition concludes that as the relative supply of high skill workers increases,
the remaining low skill workers can be made relatively worse oﬀ. The qualifications
required for the proposition to hold are suﬃcient but not necessary conditions.16 The
proposition should hold for much weaker conditions. Unfortunately, the algebraic
complexity of the solution in second degree price discrimination as given by (59),
(60) and (61) precludes the derivation of more general results.
16Incentive compatibility binds for small hH/hL and hence the qualifications in the proposition
cover a non-empty subset of the parameter space.
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